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Abstract: Despite empirical evidence that women’s presence in management positions is a source
of value co-creation for firms, these positions are still male-dominated. Some evidence from
experimental economics suggests that one reason for this imbalance is that women shy away from
competition. However, most of these studies have focused on competition systems that pit individuals
against each other. We present an economic laboratory experiment that compares competition against
others with competition against a set target. The crucial difference is that whereas the former involves
competing against opponents, the latter does not. Our results show that significantly more women are
willing to compete against a set target than against others. Furthermore, there is no reduction in men’s
participation and no general efficiency reduction. Our findings suggest that firms that aim at value
co-creation and sustainability through a gender-neutral promotion mechanism should introduce
competition against a set target and reduce competition against others. This paper contributes to
dispelling stereotypes about women’s reluctance to compete.
Keywords: behavior; competition; decision-making; experimental economics; gender; sustainability;
value co-creation
1. Introduction
It is often said that we should welcome women’s presence in the workplace because it allows us
to capitalize on the talents of our entire population, and this is certainly true. But it is also good
business. A number of studies on how groups perform indicate that workforces that vary on
dimensions such as gender, race, and ethnicity produce better decision-making processes and better
outcomes. Evidence also suggests that women’s work has positive spillovers to their family lives and
to the success of their children, which in turn benefits all of society.
Janet L. Yellen, 5 May 2017
So We All Can Succeed: 125 Years of Women’s Participation in the Economy At “125 Years of
Women at Brown Conference”, sponsored by Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island
As U.S. Federal Reserve Chair Janet L. Yellen explains, women’s presence in decision-making
positions is an important source of value co-creation for firms. Value co-creation refers to the value
that firms create for themselves and for the society and ecosystem in which they operate [1].
Despite advances in the last 30 years, business, political, and scientific leadership positions are
still largely male-dominated. In 2016, only one in four senior roles in businesses worldwide was held
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by women [2]. Although several countries have implemented gender equality policies, the results
have often been disappointing [3].
Certain studies have suggested that the low presence of women in top positions in business,
politics, and science owes partly to gender differences in the willingness to compete [4–14]. However,
most of these studies have focused on testing a particular competition type against others, the
winner-takes-all (WTA) competition. Decisions in WTA competition relate to key variables such
as culture [9,15,16], gender identity (cooperative or non-cooperative [17]), self-confidence [18–21],
risk/ambiguity attitudes [15,21], or combinations of these variables [20].
To find a more suitable competition system that appeals more to women, enables women to
reach management positions, and consequently boosts sustainable value co-creation for firms, our
research examines the willingness to compete (by gender) in the alternative competition environment
of competition against a set target. The main difference between competition against others and
competition against a set target is that the former involves competing against opponents, whereas the
latter does not. We expect competition against a set target to relate less to influences such as culture
and self-confidence. We compare willingness to compete by gender under these two competition
scenarios. Competition against a set target is a promotion mechanism that is feasible and easy to
implement for firms.
Additionally, recent studies have examined competition systems where each individual competes
against his or her own previous score as a way of self-improvement. These studies have reported that
the gender gap is not statistically significant [21–23]. However, some such studies have obtained a
different result. In a lab-in-the-field experiment in Germany, Bönte et al. [24] found that women are
on average less likely to self-select into competition against their own previous scores than men are.
This result was perhaps influenced by the identity priming effect of starting the experiment by asking
subjects to indicate their gender.
A major advantage of competition against a set target, discussed herein, is that competition
against oneself (self-improvement) potentially leads to ratchet effects, whereas competition against
an external target does not. In dynamic labor markets, the ratchet effect describes situations where
workers deliberately restrict their performance because they anticipate that firms will respond to
higher performance by demanding even better results or by cutting future pay [25,26].
We designed an economic experiment with two treatments, each one under a different competition
system. The first treatment gave subjects the choice to select payoffs from a piece-rate pay scheme
or from competition against others. The second treatment gave subjects the choice to select payoffs
from a piece-rate pay scheme or from competition against set targets that were exogenous and
challenging. Economic experiments are especially well suited to testing individuals’ decision-making
and comparing different incentive mechanisms because of the strict control that the researcher can
apply to the context. Indeed, economic laboratory results regarding competitiveness have proven to be
good predictors of career choices and labor market outcomes [27–29].
The results of the economic experiment show that significantly more women enter into
competition against a set target than competition against others. This increase in women’s
competiveness due to the type of competition is accompanied by no reduction in men’s participation
and no general efficiency reduction.
Our results provide insights to help firms develop policies that aim to reduce the gender gap in
management and thereby achieve sustainable value co-creation. Given the socioeconomic advantages
of gender-balanced societies, this research advocates competition against a set target rather than
competition against others as the recommended promotion mechanism for company and government
employees. This research also contributes to disproving stereotypes regarding women’s reluctance
to compete.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the experimental design and procedures;
Section 3 presents the results; and Section 4 discusses the findings and conclusions.
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2. Experimental Design and Procedures
To explore the effects that systems of competition exert on men and women’s decisions to enter
into competitive environments, we designed an economic laboratory experiment. The experiment had
two treatments. Competition type was the only difference between treatments.
Treatment 1 (T1) was based on competition against others [12]. Subjects started Round 1 in T1 by
summing sets of five two-digit numbers for five minutes under a piece-rate pay scheme (0.25 Euros
per correct sum). In Round 2, subjects repeated the additions test under a pay scheme based on
competition against others. The pay scheme was based on a tournament in groups. Two men and
two women were randomly selected, and only the subject who solved the largest number of correct
sums received payment (1 Euro per correct sum). Because three of the four subjects from each group
received no payment, we defined this competition as competition against others. During Round 3 of
T1, subjects repeated the additions test, choosing one of these two pay schemes. Finally, as a control
variable between treatments, Round 4 of T1 consisted of the same test under a new competitive pay
scheme, namely the scheme we introduced in Treatment 2 (T2).
T2 introduced a new competition format: competition against a set target. Target setting is a way
for individuals to compete independently. It is up to each individual, and only that individual, to meet
these targets. Table 1 illustrates the difference between the two treatments and the order of rounds.
As Table 1 shows, T2 repeated the additions test and rounds in T1, with the exception of introducing
competition against a set target in Round 2. In Round 3, subjects thus chose between piece-rate pay
(0.25 euros per correct sum) and the pay scheme based on competition against set targets. As a control
variable between treatments, Round 4 of T2 consisted of the additions test under the pay scheme based
on competition against others.
Table 1. Description of the Task 1 in the two experimental treatments and their expected payoffs.
(a) Description of the Two Experimental Treatments
Treatment 1 Treatment 2





















(b) Expected Payoff Depending on Competition Type and Number of Correct Sums
Number of Correct Sums Piece-Rate Pay (1) Competition againstOthers (2)
Competition against a
Set Target (3)
7 1.75 Ps × 7 0
8 2 Ps × 8 0
9 2.25 Ps × 9 0
10 2.5 Ps × 10 5
11 2.75 Ps × 11 8.25
12 3 Ps × 12 12
(2) Ps = subjective probability of being the best in the group of four, given the number of correct sums s.
The lower part of Table 1 shows the pay scheme of competition against a set target. Correctly
summing 10 sets of numbers paid 0.50 euros, correctly summing 11 sets paid 0.75 euros, correctly
summing 12 sets paid 1 euro, and so on. As Table 1 shows, subjects had to sum at least 10 sets of
numbers correctly to receive any payment.
For the purposes of comparison between treatments, 12 correct sums paid 1 euro in the competition
against a set target. Similarly, 12 correct sums give a subjective probability P12 equal to 1 to the
individuals in the competition against others, consequently paying 1 euro per sum. Given that 8.5 was
the average number of correct sums in T1 Round 2 (see Figure 1), 11 correct sums gave subjective
probability P11 of close to 1 in the competition against others, consequently paying 1 euro per sum, too.
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until after the four rounds (here, our experiment differs from [12]). Before receiving this information, 
subjects answered an incentivized question on their expected relative performance (within the 
group of four). The comparison between answers regarding each subject’s relative performance and 
actual position within the group measured each subject’s self-confidence. 
After the four rounds of additions, the subjects started a second task. The Task 2 consisted of an 
incentivized, decomposed game that tested for cooperative or non-cooperative behavior [30–33]. 
After this game, a third incentivized task measured attitudes to risk. Following the procedure 
described in [34], subjects made choices in nine lottery pairs based on [35]. At the end of the 
experiment, subjects answered a social questionnaire that included questions about experience in 
competitive videogames and sports. 
The 208 subjects (104 men and 104 women) were students enrolled in Economics, Business, 
International Business, and Finance and Accounting programs at the University of Valencia. We 
selected students from these programs to ensure a consistent level of math across the sample. 
Consequently, there was no expected difference in math level between men and women in this 
sample. All students passed a national exam requiring a high level of math to enroll in these 
programs. 
The computerized between-subjects experiment was run during the 2014/15 academic year, in 
October 2014 (T1) and June 2015 (T2), at the Laboratory for Research in Experimental Economics 
(LINEEX). The experiment was run using z-Tree [36]. Each treatment lasted approximately one 
hour. During the experiment, subjects could not use calculators, although they were allowed to use 
pen and paper, nor were they permitted to communicate with other subjects. They received no 
feedback on their performance until the end of the experiment, when they received their payoffs 
(19.5 euros on average). Payoffs were calculated by adding payoffs from each incentivized task. 
Only one of the rounds of Task 1 was randomly selected at the end of the experiment for inclusion in 
the payoffs. 
3. Results 
Figure 1A shows the percentage of men and women who decided to enter into competition (i.e., 
who decided to take payment type 2) in Round 3 of Task 1 for each treatment. Results show that 
competition against a set target (T2) was more attractive to both men and women: 67.31% of men 
entered into competition against a set target, whereas only 51.92% entered into competition against 
others (T1); 76.92% of women entered into competition against a set target, whereas only 51.92% 
entered into competition against others. Table 2 (Panel A) shows that this difference between 
treatments was significant (p = 0.003). Women significantly preferred competition against a set target 
to competition against others (p = 0.008). 
 
(A) 
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Figure 1. Percentage of men and women that entered into competition by treatment (A) and average 
number of correct sums by treatment, round, and gender (B). 
Table 2. Frequencies and p-values by treatment and gender. 
Panel A. Differences by Treatment 
 
Men Women Men + Women 
T1 T2 T1 T2 T1 T2 
H0: T1 = T2 
Correct sums Round 1 5.54 5.83 5.23 6.75 5.39 6.23 
Mann-Whitney test p = 0.566 p = 0.013 p = 0.025 
Enter competition 51.92% 67.31% 51.92% 76.92% 51.92% 72.12% 
Proportion test p = 0.110 p = 0.008 p = 0.003 
Self-confidence 32.69% 34.62% 21.15% 19.23% 26.92% 26.92% 
Proportion test * p = 0.836 p = 0.807 p = 0.100 
Cooperative 48.08% 34.62% 42.31% 38.46% 45.19% 36.54% 
Proportion test * p = 0.163 p = 0.689 p = 0.204 
Risk averse 77.42% 77.42% 72.97% 56.41% 75.00% 65.71% 
Proportion test * p = 1.000 p = 0.132 p = 0.233 
Sports 67.31% 65.38% 94.23% 88.46% 80.77% 76.92% 
Proportion test * p = 0.836 p = 0.295 p = 0.497 
Games 44.23% 28.85% 80.77% 84.62% 62.50% 56.73% 
Proportion test * p = 0.103 p = 0.604 p = 0.397 
Panel B. Differences by Gender 
 
T1 T2 T1 + T2 
M W M W M W 
H0: Men = Women 
Correct sums Round 1 5.54 5.23 5.83 6.75 5.68 5.99 
Mann-Whitney test p = 0.498 p = 0.145 p = 0.539 
Enter competition 51.92% 51.92% 67.31% 76.92% 59.62% 64.42% 
Proportion test * p = 1.000 p = 0.274 p = 0.475 
Self-confidence 32.69% 21.15% 34.62% 19.23% 33.65% 20.19% 
Proportion test * p = 0.185 p = 0.077 p = 0.029 
Cooperative 48.08% 42.31% 34.62% 38.46% 41.35% 40.38% 
Proportion test * p = 0.554 p = 0.684 p = 0.888 
Risk averse 77.42% 72.97% 77.42% 56.41% 77.42% 64.47% 
Proportion test * p = 0.673 p = 0.066 p = 0.098 
Sports 67.31% 94.23% 65.38% 88.46% 66.35% 91.35% 
Proportion test * p = 0.000 p = 0.005 p = 0.000 
Games 44.23% 80.77% 28.85% 84.62% 36.54% 82.69% 
Proportion test * p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.000 
Figure 1. Percentage of men and women that entered into competition by treatment (A) and average
number of correct sums by treatment, round, and gender (B).
The experiment was designed to control for variables that are presented in the literature as
potential influencers of the decision to enter into competition. These variables are self-confidence,
cooperativeness, risk aversion, experience in competitive sports, and experience in competitive games.
To test for self-confidence, subjects did not receive feedback on the number of correct sums until after
the four rounds (here, our experiment differs from [12]). Before receiving this information, subjects
answered an incentivized question on their expected relative performance (within the group of four).
The comparison between answers regarding each subject’s relative performance and actual position
within the group measured each subject’s self-confidence.
After the four rounds of additions, the subjects started a second task. The Task 2 consisted of
an incentivized, decomposed game that tested for cooperative or non-cooperative behavior [30–33].
After this game, a third incentivized task measured attitudes to risk. Following the procedure described
in [34], subjects made choices in nine lottery pairs based on [35]. At the end of the experiment, subjects
answered a social questionnaire that included questions about experience in competitive videogames
and sports.
The 208 subjects (104 men and 104 women) were students enrolled in Economics, Business,
International Business, and Finance and Accounting programs at the University of Valencia.
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We selected students from these programs to ensure a consistent level of math across the sample.
Consequently, there was no expected difference in math level between men and women in this sample.
All students passed a national exam requiring a high level of math to enroll in these programs.
The computerized between-subjects experiment was run during the 2014/15 academic year,
in October 2014 (T1) and June 2015 (T2), at the Laboratory for Research in Experimental Economics
(LINEEX). The experiment was run using z-Tree [36]. Each treatment lasted approximately one hour.
During the experiment, subjects could not use calculators, although they were allowed to use pen and
paper, nor were they permitted to communicate with other subjects. They received no feedback on
their performance until the end of the experiment, when they received their payoffs (19.5 euros on
average). Payoffs were calculated by adding payoffs from each incentivized task. Only one of the
rounds of Task 1 was randomly selected at the end of the experiment for inclusion in the payoffs.
3. Results
Figure 1A shows the percentage of men and women who decided to enter into competition
(i.e., who decided to take payment type 2) in Round 3 of Task 1 for each treatment. Results show
that competition against a set target (T2) was more attractive to both men and women: 67.31% of
men entered into competition against a set target, whereas only 51.92% entered into competition
against others (T1); 76.92% of women entered into competition against a set target, whereas only
51.92% entered into competition against others. Table 2 (Panel A) shows that this difference between
treatments was significant (p = 0.003). Women significantly preferred competition against a set target
to competition against others (p = 0.008).
Notably, no gender differences in math ability drove to the above result. As shown in the second
part of Figure 1 (Figure 1B) and as expected when selecting students from economics and business
degree programs in Spain, there were no significant gender differences in math ability in terms of
number of correct sums in Round 1 (p = 0.539, see Table 2 (Panel B)).
Table 2 presents the detailed data collected in the experiment by treatment (Table 2 (Panel A)) and
by gender (Table 2 (Panel B)). Table 2 (Panel A) shows that the number of subjects who decided to enter
into competition was the only significant difference between the treatments (T1: competition against
others; and T2: competition against set targets). As commented earlier, significantly more subjects
chose competitive payment when competing against a set target (T2) (p = 0.003, see Table 2 (Panel
A)). No other control variable, besides the (slightly significant) better ability of Treatment 2’s subjects
(p = 0.025), significantly differed between treatments. This finding is important for comparative
purposes. Whereas men were not significantly sensitive to the change in competition system (p = 0.110),
women responded positively to the change from competition against others to competition against a
set target (p = 0.008). This finding is consistent with the findings of [21–23], who studied another type
of independent competition (i.e., competition against each subject’s own previous score as a way of
self-improvement).
Interestingly, Table 2 (Panel B) shows that no gender differences in competition preferences
were found when individuals competed against a set target (p = 0.274 in T2). Men and women were
equally competitive when competing against a set target. Similar findings regarding the gender
balance in competitive decisions have been reported in studies of different systems of independent
competition [21–23]. These studies addressed competitions where individuals competed against
their own previous scores as a way of self-improvement, reporting that the gender gap was not
statistically significant.
Our experiment did not test competition against one’s own past performance. Instead,
it tested competition against targets that were external and challenging. This system of
competition is a promotion mechanism that is feasible, productive, and easy to implement for most
companies. In addition, competition against external targets, unlike competition against oneself
(self-improvement), does not lead to ratchet effects. Our results show that by introducing competition
against a set target instead of the more common form of competition against others, women are
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significantly more willing to participate in competitive environments, while men’s willingness to
compete does not differ significantly.
Table 2 (Panel B) provides further insight into gender differences. For instance, we observed
significant gender differences in self-confidence (p = 0.029). These differences owed to lower
self-confidence among women in T2 (p = 0.077), despite the higher number of correct sums by women
in Round 1. This result has been observed on numerous occasions in the primary and secondary
experimental literature [18,20,37,38].
Table 2. Frequencies and p-values by treatment and gender.
Panel A. Differences by Treatment
Men Women Men + Women
T1 T2 T1 T2 T1 T2
H0: T1 = T2
Correct sums Round 1 5.54 5.83 5.23 6.75 5.39 6.23
Mann-Whitney test p = 0.566 p = 0.013 p = 0.025
Enter competition 51.92% 67.31% 51.92% 76.92% 51.92% 72.12%
Proportion test p = 0.110 p = 0.008 p = 0.003
Self-confidence 32.69% 34.62% 21.15% 19.23% 26.92% 26.92%
Proportion test * p = 0.836 p = 0.807 p = 0.100
Cooperative 48.08% 34.62% 42.31% 38.46% 45.19% 36.54%
Proportion test * p = 0.163 p = 0.689 p = 0.204
Risk averse 77.42% 77.42% 72.97% 56.41% 75.00% 65.71%
Proportion test * p = 1.000 p = 0.132 p = 0.233
Sports 67.31% 65.38% 94.23% 88.46% 80.77% 76.92%
Proportion test * p = 0.836 p = 0.295 p = 0.497
Games 44.23% 28.85% 80.77% 84.62% 62.50% 56.73%
Proportion test * p = 0.103 p = 0.604 p = 0.397
Panel B. Differences by Gender
T1 T2 T1 + T2
M W M W M W
H0: Men = Women
Correct sums Round 1 5.54 5.23 5.83 6.75 5.68 5.99
Mann-Whitney test p = 0.498 p = 0.145 p = 0.539
Enter competition 51.92% 51.92% 67.31% 76.92% 59.62% 64.42%
Proportion test * p = 1.000 p = 0.274 p = 0.475
Self-confidence 32.69% 21.15% 34.62% 19.23% 33.65% 20.19%
Proportion test * p = 0.185 p = 0.077 p = 0.029
Cooperative 48.08% 42.31% 34.62% 38.46% 41.35% 40.38%
Proportion test * p = 0.554 p = 0.684 p = 0.888
Risk averse 77.42% 72.97% 77.42% 56.41% 77.42% 64.47%
Proportion test * p = 0.673 p = 0.066 p = 0.098
Sports 67.31% 94.23% 65.38% 88.46% 66.35% 91.35%
Proportion test * p = 0.000 p = 0.005 p = 0.000
Games 44.23% 80.77% 28.85% 84.62% 36.54% 82.69%
Proportion test * p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.000
* Two-sided t-test of proportions.
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Despite their lower self-confidence, however, women did enter into competition against a set
target. Cultural aspects such as gender-specific beliefs about one’s own skills or others’ skills, are
not influential in decisions to enter into competition against set targets. Subjects in competitions
against others must deal with their own (subjective) chances of being good enough and with the
(subjective) chances of encountering someone in the group who is better. This finding reinforces the
gender neutrality of competition against a set target as a promotion mechanism for firms.
In this experiment, more women than men reported having experience in competitive sports
(p = 0.000) and competitive games (p = 0.000). There were also slightly significant gender differences in
risk aversion (p = 0.098).
Table 3 shows the Logit regression with the experimental data, where the decision to enter into
competition in Round 3 of Task 1 is the dependent variable.
Table 3. Logit regression for entering into competition in Round 3 of Task 1.
Variables
Overall Women Men
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Constant −2.66 0.78 *** −2.54 1.02 ** −2.68 1.13 ** −2.54 1.10 **
Gender 0.05 0.35 −0.38 0.46
Treatment 0.83 0.32 ** 1.07 0.40 ** 1.03 0.47 ** 0.59 0.45
Correct sums
R1 0.22 0.07 *** 0.28 0.09 ** 0.19 0.09 ** 0.29 0.11 ***
Self-confidence −0.29 0.36 −0.31 0.48 −0.35 0.56 −0.02 0.50
Cooperative 0.78 0.32 −0.24 0.40 0.86 0.48 * −0.66 0.46
Risk averse −0.15 0.45
Sports 0.98 0.40 ** 0.67 0.50 0.49 0.79 1.17 0.49 **
Games −0.09 0.36 −0.31 0.44 0.02 0.59 −0.70 0.48
N 208 138 104 104
Prob. > X2 <0.001 0.001 0.007 0.002
Pseudo R2 0.116 0.148 0.132 0.145
*, ** and *** significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level; N, number of subjects.
Treatment was significant. Differences between treatments owed to the significant difference in
women’s decisions to compete depending on the competition system. Comparing model (b) with
model (a) illustrates that including risk aversion did not substantially affect the treatment difference.
Please note that model (a) was estimated with the 208 subjects of the experiment, while model (b) was
estimated with only the 138 subjects that made consistent choices in Task 3, which was designed to
elicit the subject’s risk attitudes (nine lottery pairs based on [35]). As expected, another variable that
differentiated decisions to enter into competition was subjects’ ability (correct sums in Round 1). Thus,
for value co-creation purposes, firms may consider altering promotion mechanisms such that they
emphasize targets rather than direct competition with others. Our results show that while men are
not sensitive to this change, women respond positively (treatment is significant in model (c) and not
significant in model (d)).
4. Discussion and Conclusions
Empirical evidence has shown that ensuring a gender balance in management is a source of
sustainable value co-creation for firms. Nevertheless, in 2016, decision-making positions within firms
were still largely male-dominated.
We sought to identify a promotion mechanism that encourages more women to compete for
decision-making positions. Accordingly, we experimentally compared willingness to compete by
gender across two systems of competition: competition against others and competition against a set
target. Competition against a set target emphasizes goals rather than direct competition against others.
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This competition system is easy to implement in corporations, at least at low- and mid-level promotion
stages, which give individuals a platform to reach top positions.
Our results imply that women are more willing to compete against a set target than against
others, even when they lack self-confidence. Women low self-confidence has been generally found
in empirical and experimental literature. For example, women low self-confidence has been found
to account for the majority of the gender difference in entrepreneurial propensity [39–41]. Another
interesting finding is that competition against a set target does not reduce productivity, yet it does
offer a gender-neutral incentive mechanism. Competition against a set target provides an alternative
to removing competitive features of the environment. This alternative is therefore attractive because
competitive features have been shown to boost performance. Moreover, competition against a set
target, unlike competition against oneself (self-improvement), does not lead to ratchet effects.
Our findings support the implementation of promotion policies that depend heavily on work done
and that do not require direct, interpersonal competition. Our findings have implications regarding
sustainable value co-creation, especially given potential positive spillovers to the domains of children
and family life. An interesting example of such a policy is the university faculty promotion mechanism
that was introduced by the Spanish government in 2005. A set of targets must be reached and centrally
evaluated for candidates to achieve promotion to full professor. In nine years, the percentage of women
full professors has increased from 13.7% to 20.8%.
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